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1Believing the self-contradictory*
Abstract. An argument for the rationality of religious belief in the existence of God is defended. 
After reviewing three preconditions for rational belief, I show reasons to privilege the criterion of 
consistency. Taking the inconsistency of the religious belief in God and the belief in the scientific 
world picture as the impediment to a rational belief in God, I propose that we can overcome this 
objection by assuming, firstly, that God is a universal class. This allows us to put the problem of 
God in set-theoretic terms, such that the antinomy that follows from such an assumption can be 
overcome by assuming that God is not a subject but a strict class that cannot be individuated. I  
conclude that that the self-contradictory nature of God does not prevent the believer from making a 
rational,  ethical assessment that the contradiction resides in the possibility of using language to 
explain his existence, but that this does not make belief in the existence of God unjustifiable – on 
the contrary. In this way, we can say statements that claim God exists are justifiable.
1. Three logics of justification 
Traditionally,  there  are  three  sorts  of  attitude  to  religious  belief  that  form  the  three  great 
interlocutive  positions  in  the  discussion  of  religion:  those  who believe  that  God exists,  or  the 
believers;1 those who do not believe that God is exists, or the atheists; and those who believe that  
neither position is justifiable given our human limits, or the agnostics. Among the various thematics 
into which this discussion flows, one of the commonest, as it connects the abstraction of the topic 
with practice, is how to make a choice among these three stances. In other words, how do we justify 
our adherence to one of these three positions? 
The advocate for religious belief has at least one advantage, in that it is generally agreed that a 
belief needn't be ascertained to be true in order to be held. I may have good reasons to find ‘x’ belief 
plausible  without  being  able  to  prove  it  according  to  some verificational  protocol.  Thus  I  am 
entitled to believe that God exists without having to establish his existence once for all. The lack of 
a conclusive proof  doesn't prevent me from believing something true. But still, I do need reasons to 
have  acquired  my  belief.  Who  knows  anything  about  him?  We  must  remember,  here,  that 
knowledge is not the point about God, anyway, as he is not simply the object of inquiry. After all,  
by definition, our entire being and social structure, including inquiry, is grounded on God. That we 
believe in God does highlight the fact that one can believe as strongly as possible without ever 
knowing anything about this possibly empty term. 
However, any belief ought to be justified before we can talk about its being true (or not): a belief  
must be justifiable in order to be a valid belief, that is, a belief that could be entertained by any 
reasonable subject. Now what sort of justification do we need to believe correctly? 
Let us state a first criterion for correct belief in terms of indefensibility: 
(1a)  A given sentence  p is  justifiable  only if  the negation of  p is  indefensible,  i.e.  there is  no 
evidence for p to be false.2
But this statement is still ambiguous: does the absence of justification against  p mean that there 
cannot  ever  be such a  justification,  or,  rather,  does  it  simply have a  temporal  sense:  up to  the 
present,  none  has  been  found?  In  order  to  go  beyond  a  merely  falsificationist  definition  of 
* I am grateful to Dorota Rybicka for our informal exchange about the present talk, as well as the anynomous referee 
for his (her) helpful notes. 
1“Believers” will be used as a synonym for the theists or positive believers about the sentence p: “God is existing”, 
throughout the paper. Admittedly, the atheists are also believers; but they are negative believers about p. 
2 Evidence can be an empirical datum, a thought experiment, a formal proof, or even an intimate experience.
2justification, we add a further condition to the latter, as follows: 
(1b) Any evidence for p entails that there is no evidence for its negation, ~p. 
The condition thus modifies the skeptic view of justification: (1a) entails (1b) from this perspective, 
whereas a mere falsificationist view doesn't mean that there cannot be evidence for ~p if there are 
none yet.
If we adopt (1a)-(1b) together, such a necessary condition for belief appears to be very stringent: it 
could satisfy a skeptic, but hardly an agnostic, or even a theist for whom the existence of God can 
be believed without a conclusive evidence.3 Moreover, an application of (1) would entail that very 
few sentences could be properly believed, because most of our beliefs rely upon empirical evidence 
whose falsifiability conditions make their negations clearly arguable. 
To loosen up our conditions in order to allow a greater scope for belief, an alternative, weaker 
condition  for  correct  belief  can  be  constructed  from  supposing  a  criterion  of  justifiability  as 
defensibility, which should hold for both believers and atheists4: 
(2) A given sentence p is justifiable if p is defensible, i.e. there is some evidence for p to be true.5
The import of (2) is a “glass half full, glass half empty” story. That God may exist is a sufficient 
reason to believe in His existence (i.e. believing the sentence p: “God is existing”), according to the 
believer; that God may be not existing is a sufficient reason to believe in His inexistence, according 
to the atheist.6
However,  it  is  unlikely that  an armed truce like this  will  bring the religious discussion to  a 
satisfactory close. Alternatively, the mere possibility that God exists does not give the skeptic a 
sufficient reason to believe in His existence or even his inexistence. In a sense, this is agnosticism 
straight, in distinction from the soft logic of believers and atheists. At the same time, an anti-skeptic  
logic of soft justification would turn out to be troublesome if whatever possible is justifiable: any 
contingent sentence would entail that the believer is entitled to believe both p and its negation, i.e. 
~p.7 Correspondingly, most of the atheists and believers seem at this stage in the debate to operate 
as partial or bad faith agents from a skeptic point of view, reserving a duplicitous double register of 
justification in which both take any evidence for or against the existence of God to be a sufficient 
reason to support their  belief,  but requiring that their  opponent give conclusive (i.e.  necessary) 
evidence for or against the existence of God. In other words, they shift the burden of the proof (or 
conclusive evidence) onto their opponent, only: the agnostic theist would require any atheist being 
gnostic, and conversely.8 
3 By a “theist” is meant whoever believes in the existence of God. No relevant difference is made here between 
theism and deism, although depicting God as a universal class sounds more like a argument for deism (God as an 
impersonal logos). Note that being an agnostic believer is not self-defeating: agnosticism merely means that it is not 
possible to establish the existence of God, and that this needn't lead to atheism, since it is not possible to establish  
the that there is no God, either. 
4   The atheist attitude can be depicted by substituting ~p for p in (2).
5 Let B stand for belief, and E for defensibility (Ep means “there is an evidence for the sentence p”). Then (1) and (2) 
result in three distinct axioms for two opposite logics of justification, namely: (1a) Bp → ~E~p, (1b) Ep → ~E~p, 
and (2) Ep → Bp. Ep entails ~E~p for a skeptic, but not for a mere believer: that there is no evidence for ~p (i.e. no 
evidence against  p) does not force the believer to conclude that  there is  an evidence for  p.  This means that  E 
proceeds like a strong modal operator  in the strong (conclusive) sense of evidence and like a weak one  in the 
weak (testimonial) sense:  not any evidence for ~p is  an argument against  p in the latter case,  for there can be 
evidence for both.
6 (1a) entails E~p → ~Bp (by contraposition), but not E~p → B~p. Thus (1) is not a proper logic for believers and  
atheists, but is adequate for skeptics.
7 Let C stand for contingency. Cp ↔ (Ep ∧ E~p), then, by (2), Cp → (Bp ∧ B~p). And given that the logic of the 
believer is taken to be normal, B~p → ~Bp. Therefore, (2) entails Cp → (Bp ∧ ~Bp). 
8 The logic of the atheist amounts to taking non-belief and negative belief to be equivalent: ~Bp ↔ B~p, so that ~Ep 
3However, faith is a bad faith only if we already subscribed to the skeptic criterion for belief as 
requiring conclusive evidence, whether for or against a given sentence. Against this strong criterion 
for evidence in (1), faith seems to be described better in terms of a special logic of merely religious 
belief  that  would  support  (2),  while  contravening  one  of  the  basic  axioms  of  epistemic  logic, 
namely: 
(3) If p is merely believed, then p is not known.9
Unlike the skeptic, the believer does not require any conclusive evidence for his belief and this 
holds equally whether the belief is in the existence or inexistence of God. I need not have a definite 
proof to believe in him, while having some reason to prefer this opinion rather than the contrary 
one. 
     And yet, (3) is hardly defensible for a believer in the sense that a logic of religious belief cannot  
go  on  claiming  that  logical knowledge  is  incompatible  with  religious  belief,  since  a  proof  of 
impossibility or necessity should force the believer to either relinquish his belief or endorse non-
belief, respectively. In this respect, St. Anselm and Descartes' alleged proofs for the existence of 
God are intended to show that believing is not only justifiable but necessary: I cannot not believe in 
God, and I believe in Him all the more that I know that it is impossible for Him not to exist. Now 
given that (3) makes any allegedly religious belief incompatible with logical knowledge10, it should 
be replaced by another logic including logical knowledge. The believer’s argument is premised on a 
logic that is weaker than (1), but stronger than (2) and (3).
Consistency  seems  to  be  a  necessary  condition  assuming  that  the  believer  in  the  debate 
recognizes  the  Aristotelian  Principle  of  Non-Contradiction  (hereafter:  PNC).  According  to  the 
psychological version of the PNC,11 no one may logically believe that God exists and does not exist. 
This rule equally holds for all  our three parties:  believers,  atheists,  and agnostics. As a way to 
strengthen (2), the participant in the debate must choose between believing  p or its negation ~p, 
even if there is evidence to support both contents. Let us specify that consistency is not only a 
property of  what  the sentence says  taken in isolation;12 rather,  consistency expresses a  relation 
between the given sentence  p and the believer's set of initially accepted sentences  q. Hence the 
resulting condition for correct belief:
(4) A given sentence  p is justifiable only if it  is consistent with every other sentence  q already 
accepted by the believer.13
Thus far, defensibility is a sufficient condition and consistency is a necessary condition for correct 
→ B~p. An abductive reasoning can display this partial treatment of evidence in the atheist: pain and injustice are 
taken to be a sufficient evidence against the existence of God, while the beautiful harmony in snow crystals is not  
sufficient to establish divine design. The converse is true for the believer.
9 According  to  the  mainstream  epistemology,  epistemic  logic  states  that  knowledge  is  a  justified  true  belief. 
Accordingly, belief is one of the necessary conditions for knowledge and the following is given to be an epistemic 
axiom: Kp → Bp. To the contrary, a religious belief assumes a logic of mere belief that is incompatible with the 
preceding axiom: if Bp → ~Kp, then Kp → ~Bp (by contraposition).
10 For if we can deduce logical knowledge from every logical truth,  then no such truth should be believed according to 
(3): Kp → B~p (see note 9). 
11 Łukasiewicz (2000) stated three formulations of the PNC: an ontological version (no object can have and not have 
the same property); a logical version (two judgments where the one attaches to the object the very property refused 
by the other one cannot be true together); and a psychological version (any two convictions related to contradictory 
judgments cannot coexist in the same mind). (3) concerns the latter version.
12 This is self-consistency; the ensuing difference between contradiction and self-contradiction is detailed in the next 
section.
13 To simplify the criterion of consistency, we state that it requires the agent not to believe both a given sentence and  
its negation: (3) Bp → ~B~p. (3) is incompatible with (2), for Ep → Bp, E~p → B~p and, therefore, (Ep ∧ E~p) → 
(Bp ∧ B~p) entails by (2) that (Ep ∧ E~p) → (Bp ∧ ~Bp).
4belief. Against those who might still object that (4) is redundant with (2) due to the identity of  
defensibility and consistency, there is, in fact, a difference between them: a sentence p is defensible 
whenever it is not self-contradictory, i.e. not contradictory with itself; furthermore, it is consistent 
whenever it is not contradictory with other sentences q in a given belief set. For if p is inconsistent 
with a given set of beliefs A but self-consistent, this merely means that p should not be included in 
A,  even  if  it  is  compatible  with  other  contexts.  However,  if  p is  self-contradictory  (or  self-
inconsistent), this means that p is impossible to be believed in every respect or irrespective of any 
belief set.
Having unpacked the meaning of  justification, we can now see that, in the context of the logic of 
belief,  justification  combines  two  interconnected  but  domain different  modalities,  namely: 
defensibility as conceivability, or  mental possibility; consistency as  logical possibility. Moreover, 
(2) and (4) entail that everything conceivable is self-consistent:
(5) A sentence p is self-defensible only if it is self-consistent, i.e. believing p entails not believing its 
negation ~p,
i.e.  whatever  is  conceivable  cannot  be  self-contradictory.14 If  so,  I  cannot  justifiably  believe 
something inconsistent.  This minimal condition for grasping a thought is  at  stake for our main 
point, which concerns religious belief about the existence of God. 
To sum up, we have proposed three semantically different modes of justification, which we will 
label as follows:  a skeptical logic with (1), where an evidence must be conclusive to be properly 
evidential; a relativist logic with (2), where every evidence is defensible and leads to inconsistent 
beliefs; and a dogmatist logic for (4). The latter will now be the focus of our attention, as it has been 
favoured as a proper criterion for correct  belief.15 As we will  see,  it  seems to entail  an atheist 
position about the religious belief that God is existing. 
2. Is God a self-contradictory subject?
A number of arguments  contribute to  the notion that  the argument  for  God’s existence is  self-
defeating. 
On the one hand, doubting the existence of God has been taken to be self-contradictory by St. 
Anselm or Descartes: it is not possible to conceive the supreme Being as perfect without assuming 
his existence necessarily. To contemporary ears, this sort of argument somehow sounds like the 
performative account of the cogito once thinking of God is taken to be a caused action. According 
to  this  view,  it  is  not  only that  such  a  conceivable  sentence  as  “God exists”  is  consistent:  its 
negation is self-inconsistent, so that God cannot be conceived as inexistent.16 However, looked at 
from the other side, such an argument does not make the atheist position self-defeating because it 
relies upon a contraposited version of (5): whatever is not self-consistent is not conceivable; God's 
14 Note that “conception” differs from “imagination”, among the range of mental possibilities: the former concept  
gives us the formal object of a judgment, while the latter is derived from being somehow being able to picture the 
object.  Descartes' case of the chiliagon marks this difference out: a thousand-sided polygon can be conceived, but  
not imagined. Hume supports (5) in his “Enquiry concerning Human Understanding”: everything conceivable is 
possible, equating possibility with non-contradiction. Furthermore, (5) could be reasonably strengthened in the form 
of  a  biconditional,  in  the  sense  that  it  hardly  makes  sense  to  state  that  something  self-consistent  may  be  
unconceivable. The question remains open, noting that the converse (5) seems to make sense only if “conceivable”  
is replaced by “(actually) conceived”. About the notions of conception, imagination, logical possibility and their  
logical interrelations, see Costa-Leite (2011).
15 For a detailed analysis of these three sorts of justification, see Ganeri (2002) and Schang (2010b).
16 About St. Anselm's argument, see his  Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei existentia; about Descartes' proof, see his 
Metaphysical  Meditations,  especially Books III  and V;  about  the performativeness  of  the  cogito argument,  see 
Hintikka (1962). 
5inexistence  is  not  self-consistent17;  hence  God's  inexistence  is  not  conceivable.  Now  God's 
inexistence  is  not  a  self-inconsistent  judgment:  it  is  merely  inconsistent  with  the  two  initial 
judgments that existence is a predicate and every cause has a supreme cause, respectively. 
On the other hand, a logical consequence of God's perfection may lead to the contrary conclusion 
that God's existence is a self-contradictory idea that cannot be conceived accordingly.18 
Is  God a  self-contradictory object?  The referent  of  a  sentence  is  not  capable  of  being  self-
contradictory in the logical sense: contradiction refers only to a condition that emerges in language. 
Thus,  when we analyze the term God for ‘contradictions’ in the language we use about  God’s 
existence, we are using the subject at hand as a dummy singular term (a Russellian proper name) 
and a definite description, in accordance with Russell's theory. For instance, any sentence about a 
round square is self-contradictory because it states something about a term that is round and not 
round. Can impossible objects, the referents of the subject, exist? In as much as existence is co-
extensive  with  conceivability,  there  are  necessarily  no  impossible  objects.  Whatever  is  self-
contradictory cannot be conceived.  
As an exception to (5),  Łukasiewicz took the case of the Trinity in order to make his point 
against the so-called universality of the PNC.19
 Let  φ be a complex sentence composed of three simple sentences  p: “God is the Father”,  q: 
“God is the Son”, and r: “God is the Holy Spirit”. Prima facie, φ is a conjunction of three contrary 
and,  a fortiori,  contradictory  sentences  that  cannot  all  be  true  about  the  same object,  because 
whoever is the Father is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit. To put it in Fregean terms: these three 
names are not, like the morning star and the evening star,  different senses for one reference. Each 
of the three is supposed to express one unique individual. If we employ a Quinean paraphrase to 
turn these singular terms into predicates, our φ will say that there are three different individuals and 
that God is each of these. If so, then the Trinity is to the effect that there is a x that is y and z while y 
is not z, so that the premises x = y, x = z and y ≠ z imply that x ≠ x. Contradiction: it is impossible to 
believe such a sentence as φ, according to (5).
While admitting this reading, Łukasiewicz begs the point in saying that contradiction may not be 
a necessary condition for meaningfullness or, rather, that it should be bracketed for certain sorts of 
religious beliefs that go beyond any rational understanding. However, there is another and obvious 
way to  state  that  φ is  not self-contradictory  without  violating  any property  of  classical  logic, 
bringing up the issue of predication and the meaning of “being”, or in other words, the relation 
between identity and membership. As to whether φ should be a contradictory sentence to be rejected 
by (5), let us return to the basic formulation of opposition in terms of predication with classes and 
their corresponding sentences (i.e. the basic form 'S is P' for  p). What sort of Russellian proper 
name should God ever be, assuming that the Trinity really differs from a dummy proper name?
Any two sentences p and q are said to be contrary if and only if they cannot be true together and 
can be false together. They are said to be contradictory if and only if they cannot both be true and 
cannot both be false. Accordingly,  p,  q and  r should be contrary to each other: none of the pairs 
{p,q}, {p,r} and {q,r} can be true together, but they can all be false. A sample of contrary sentences 
has been displayed by Keynes (1884) in order to characterize the Aristotelian square of opposition 
within a logic of classes. Thus the universal pairs {A,E}, {A',E}, {A,E'} and {A',E'} are taken to 
be cases in point, where: A: “Every S is P”, A': “Every not-S is not-P”, E: “No S is P”. and E': “No 
not-S is not-P”.20 Which of these pairs is a counterpart of φ? Following the Quinean paraphrase of 
17 It could be replied to this account that existence might not be taken to be a predicate, as famously claimed by Kant.  
But this does not undetermine my point  at  all,  insofar  as “being existing” can be safely replaced there “being  
existing as such and such”. I thank the anonymous referee for emphasizing this technical point.
18 About St. Anselm's argument and its ensuing antinomy, see Vuillemin (1971). 
19 See Łukasiewicz (2000), pp. 70-1.
20 Such a translation of classes into universal sentences yields the following relations in first-order predicate logic: 
      Sentences Logic of classes First order logic
      A: SaP        S∈P             ∀x (S(x) → P(x))
6singular terms, φ states that whatever S-izes is P and only one x P-izes. Although they are usually 
said to be contrary, there are two opposite conditions for these pairs to be true: {A,E} and {A',E'} 
are true pairs if and only if no x is S, whereas {A',E} and {A,E'} are true pairs if and only if every 
x is P. The first condition fulfills the atheist position in as much as it is construed in Christian terms, 
meaning that S is an empty class or, equivalently, that God does not exist if He is both the Father 
and something else (i.e. the Son and the Holy Spirit). [Wouldn’t the atheist position be, rather, that 
he couldn’t be a Father at all and be God? As being a father is defined in biological terms, having to 
do with passing on DNA, and God is not physical?] 
Reply of the author: My point is that the atheist claims that God does not exist, irrespective of the 
reasons why he claims so; the materialist-minded (or biological) argument suggested above by the 
anonymous reader can be neglected, accordingly.
Conversely, the second condition can satisfy the believer’s claim if it entails that P is a universal 
class [instead of the referent of a Russellian proper name] 
Note of the author: does any Russellian proper name have to be a particular subject by definition? I 
haven't assumed it thus far, and I take a universal class to be a possibly Russellian proper name so 
long as it denotes an object rather than expressing a Fregean sense.
and requires for God to be everything (every x). The third pair {A,E'}: 
(6) ∀x((S(x) → P(x)) ∧ (~S(x) → P(x))
is  a  plausible  candidate for the truth of  φ,  therefore.21 Letting P for “God” and S for e.g.  “the 
Father”, it is true that the Father is God and not only the Father but the Son and the Holy Spirit too, 
which are not S. By the same token, that God is P and not S prevents one from believing something 
self-contradictory with  φ:  the intersection (S∈P ∩ S'∈P) clearly differs from (S∈P ∩ S∉P) and 
implies that nothing contradictory is said about God in the Trinity.
But there is still a problem. Assuming that S and P are two unique classes with only one member, 
that God is the Father and someone other (the Son and the Holy Spirit) entails that two individuals 
are one and the same: “S is P” means an identity (“S = P”), and this is more than merely saying a 
membership  “S∈P”  since  identity  (“S  = P”)  means  two-sided  membership  (“S∈P and  P∈S”). 
Accordingly, the pair {A,E'} should be reformulated in stating that “Every S is every P, and every 
not-S is every P”.22 It results in the following conjunction of biconditionals: 
(7) ∀x((S(x) ↔ P(x)) ∧ (~S(x) ↔ P(x)), 
the truth-condition of which cannot be merely satisfied by the truth of every P: it is true only if 
      A': S'aP' = PaS        S'∈P'          ∀x (~S(x) → ~P(x))
      E: SeP = SaP'     P∈S'          ∀x (S(x) → ~P(x))
      E': S'eP' = S'aP        P'∈S          ∀x (~S(x) → P(x))
     {A,E}: SaP and SeP    S∈P ∩ S∈P'     ∀x((S(x) → P(x)) ∧ (S(x) → ~P(x))
     {A',E}: S'aP' and SeP   S'∈P' ∩ S∈P'     ∀x((~S(x) → ~P(x)) ∧ (S(x) → ~P(x))
     {A,E'}: SaP and S'eP'   S∈P ∩ S'∈P     ∀x((S(x) → P(x)) ∧ (~S(x) → P(x))
     {A',E'}: S'aP' and S'eP'    S'∈P' ∩ S'∈P     ∀x((~S(x) → ~P(x)) ∧ (~S(x) → P(x))
21 Let us assume that v(P(x)) = T. For every x, if v(S(x)) = T then v(S(x) → P(x)) = v(~S(x) → P(x)) = T; if v(S(x)) = F 
then v(S(x) → P(x)) = v(~S(x) → P(x)) = T. Therefore v((6)) ≠ F, and v((6)) = T only if v(S(x)) = T.  Hence A and E' 
can be true together and are not contraries. 
The first condition is related to the well-known topic of traditional logic: the so-called “existential import”, stating 
that the Aristotelian square is valid only if no class is empty. For a validation of the square with or without a non-
empty model, see Schang (2010b) and another paper with Saloua Chatti (in preparation): “Import, or not? On the  
meaning of negation in the Aristotelian square”. 
22 This formulation has been put forth by Sir William Hamilton, in his doctrine of quantified predicates.
7every x is S, every x is P, … and no x is P. By obversion, that no x is P entails that every x is not-P 
and this amounts to a self-contradictory sentence (x∈P ∩ x∉P). No such sentence is possible to be 
believed, unless we come to admit that some sentences are both true and false.23 But to do this is 
only presupposing what is forbidden by the clause of consistency (5) for every correct belief. 
3. Is God a proper class? 
The  problem can  be  stated  as  follows:  how  can  God  be  everything  without  entailing  a  self-
contradiction and, accordingly, being an impossible thing?  [Isn’t the problem rather that you are 
saying both that God is every x and that God is a unique class?] 
Note of the author: the former entails the latter, i.e. God's being a unique class entails that God is a 
self-contradictory object; see the biconditional form of (7) in this respect.
A radical “solution” to this problem is to claim that nothing can be properly said about God, 
while everything is said by him (or his name). This means that God cannot be treated as a proper 
subject S in a predication like “S is P”, since no class can include Him fully without restricting His 
domain of application and negating His “perfection” as it stands. A corollary of this assumption is 
that God cannot be individuated: no definite collection of properties can be attached to Him in order 
to determine His identity; determinatio est negatio, as claimed by Spinoza,24 so that the very process 
of  predication is  unable  to  express  anything consistent  about  God.  But  could  anything be said 
without subsuming a subject under a given concept? 
That God may not fall under any other class than himself has been echoed repeatedly in Hegel's 
philosophy  about  Eastern  thoughts:  according  to  the  latter,  contradiction  doesn't  oppose  two 
exclusive but, rather, inclusive or complementary sentences that may be accepted together if we sort 
them according to a context in which each plays a role in a sub-context. Likewise, it  has been 
argued elsewhere that some Indian non-classical logics admit a case where one sentence could be 
asserted and denied simultaneously or, conversely, that it can be neither asserted nor denied when it 
deals  with  some extra-rational  entities  like  Atman or  Brahman.25 No wonder,  if  so,  given  that 
everything and nothing can be said about God: nothing, as a subject; everything, as a predicate. 
Whatever the final word may be about this logical debate between the promoters of Aristotle and 
Heraclitus, set theory is the culprit that leads us to atheism if we put our belief into only well built  
sets; no sentence could make sense without resorting to a subsumptive relation between a class P 
and its element S.
At the same time, the view that God is an unexpressible and universal class also avoids the well-
known set-theoretical paradox that normally follows from it: if God is taken to be the set of all the  
sets, then it leads to the famous Russell's Paradox that disallows such a universal set because it must 
include  itself  while,  as  the  brackets  of  the  set,  not  include  itself.26 A way  out  to  this  self-
23 Such is the case with the Logic in Paradox in Priest (1979), where some sentences are assigned the paradoxical  
truth-value {T,F}. Then v(S(x)) = {T,F} entails that (7) is true: if v(P(x)) = T, then v((S(x) ↔ P(x)) = v(~S(x) ↔ P(x)) 
= {T,F}; the same if v(P(x)) = F, so that (7) is always true and false (and, hence, true). 
24 B. Spinoza,  Opera IV, “Letter to Jelles”, 240; see also Łukasiewicz (2000), 60. Another way to put it is that any 
sentence  must  be  truly  negated  to  be  informative,  following  Carnap's  theory  of  information:  tautology  and 
contradiction say nothing, accordingly.
25 A sentence that can be both asserted and denied is said to be “avaktavya”, whose translation is variously rendered as 
“unassertable”, “undescriptible”, “unsayable”, or “unexpressible”. About these Indian non-classical logics and the 
status of contradiction within these, see e.g. Tripathi (1968) and Schang (2009a,2010).
26 Russell's Paradox is an indirect consequence from Cantor's Paradox (1891), according to which the set of all subsets  
of A (the powerset of A) has a strictly greater cardinality than A itself: Card(℘(A)) > Card(A). Now if A = U is the 
set of all the sets, then Card(A) > Card(℘(A)). Contradiction. If we weaken A by stating that a universal set does not 
contain itself as a member, it follows from it that, if  x is a member of itself, then it is not a member of itself by 
definition: x∈x → x∉x.; and, conversely, if x is not a member of itself, then it is a member of itself by definition: 
x∈x ← x∉x. Therefore  x is a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself:  x∈x ↔ x∉x. This set-
theoretical formulation may be turned into a semantic version in terms of sentential truth and falsity: the sentence p, 
8contradiction occurs in John von Neumann's distinction between a set and a class: unlike a set, a 
proper class cannot be included within another set and figure in the left-sided part of a membership 
relation. In other words, everything said in connection with God should be said, not about Him, but 
in His name: “God is love”, e.g., must be replaced with “Love is divine”. Such a reversion would be 
trivial in a usual logic of classes S and P, insofar as S and P can be interchangeably treated as  
subjects or predicates by conversion;27 but it is not whenever class and proper class are separated 
and accounted for by the very special nature of God. It can be finally argued that, pace Priest,28 the 
distinction  between  sets  and  classes  is  an  appropriate  solution  to  the  inconsistency  of  God's 
perfection.  The price to  pay for a proper  belief  on this  account  is  that  God be not  predicable, 
therefore not expressible by any other predicate that must be included into himself as a perfect, i.e. 
proper class.29 [Here, since you are using Christianity as the archetype of religious belief, you might 
mention that in the Judeo-Christian tradition, there is a thematic of disallowing the pronunciation of 
God’s name. One can construe this as a response to the fact that God is not a Russellian proper  
name, and taking God to be that kind of name is to misunderstand God’s referential status.]
4. Conclusion: an ethics of justified belief
After  reviewing three logics  of justification and opting for one feasible  but  consistent  view of 
proper belief, it seems as if the meaning of the claim that God is perfect is not, pace? per Anselm 
and Descartes, that God is a necessary existent, but that talk about God shows that we have to go 
outside the limits of language in order not to utter self-contradictory statements about God. Must he 
be made silent, accordingly? Yes, if we don't want to fall into misleading predications about his 
nature. But our incapacity to grasp a thought that is only intelligible outside of our language doesn't 
negate the content of such a dummy thought, it merely posits a relationship between it and our 
language, putting into relief the limit of the latter. In a nutshell, we are entitled to believe in God; 
but in silence, or in such a way that the words don't purport to rule the true and the false.
The point here is not that any proper logic for understanding God should violate the rule of non-
contradiction by allowing true contradictions. Rather, a believer would be entitled to reply that God 
created everything and rejected a world in which contradictories could be true together for His 
thinking creatures.30 
“p is false”,  is true if and only if p is false.
27 Such a reversion between subjects and predicates has been urged by Ludwig Feuerbach as an atheist argument to the  
effect that “Man is to Man the supreme being”. According to Max Stirner, “So Feuerbach instructs us that, 'if one 
only inverts speculative philosophy, i.e. always makes the predicate the subject, and so makes the subject the object 
and principle, one has the undraped truth, pure and clean'. [Anekdota II,  64]. Herewith, to be sure, we lose the 
narrow religious standpoint, lose the God, who from this standpoint is subject; but we take in “exchange for it the 
other side of the religious standpoint, the moral standpoint. E.g., we no longer say 'God is love', but 'Love is divine'. 
If we further put in place of the predicate 'divine' the equivalent 'sacred', then, as far as concerns the sense, all the  
old comes back again. According to this, love is to be the good in man, his divineness, that which does him honor, 
his true humanity (it 'makes him Man for the first time', makes for the first time a man out of him). So then it would  
be more accurately worded thus: Love is what is  human in man, and what is inhuman is the loveless egoist”. (M. 
Stirner, The Ego and its Own, New York, Tucker, B. (ed.), 1907, 61). 
Feuerbach assumes hereby that whatever exists does so as a subject and must be individuated. We do not.
28 According to  Priest,  von Neumann's  distinction and  Tarski's  metalanguage “are not  solutions.  A paradox is  an 
argument with premises which appear to be true and steps which appear to be valid, which nevertheless ends in a  
conclusion which is false. A solution would tell us which premise is false or which step invalid; but moreover it  
would give us an independent reason for believing the premise or the step to be wrong. If we have no reason for 
rejecting  the  premise  or  the  step  other  than  that  it  blocks  the  conclusion,  then  the  'solution'  is  ad  hoc and 
unilluminating.” (Priest (1979, 220). 
29 This account of God as an unsayable entity nicely matches with the Judeo-Christian tradition as disallowing the very 
pronunciation of God's name. For one can construe this as a response to the fact that God is not a Russellian proper  
name, while taking God to be that kind of name is to misunderstand God’s referential status. I thank again the  
anonymous referee for this relevant note.
30 Such an ethical account of the PNC is given in Lukasiewicz (2000): there is no logical proof for the PNC, which is 
9A final  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  God  as  the  cause  of  every creature  and  God as 
entertained by some of these creatures (i.e. us, the believing agents): that no one could think about 
him self-consistently does not imply that he does not exist, because he might still have wanted to 
restrict  our understanding in accordance to his  almighty and good deliberation.  In other words: 
assuming that the order of truth is subjected to the order of good, whatever cannot be true for us 
might be true for Him because, unlike fallible creatures, his perfect will leads him not to act badly, 
but, in relation to creatures of an imperfect will (who cannot, for instance, will their all of their 
conceptions to be imaginable) should restrict the understanding of those who can. Here we have 
self-consistent grounds for claiming that our limited understanding is not a sufficient condition to 
decide about whatever is entitled to exist or not. 
I'm not entitled to believe anything properly about God, for want of any consistent judgment 
about Him. But the failure of the believer to convince the atheist conclusively that rational belief 
that God  exists  is  still  compatible  with  the  belief  in God  and  his  attributes,  including,  most 
pertinently, as the one who limited our language for a good reason. Here is a sufficient evidence for 
being both rational and a theist.
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viewed as a necessary condition for agents to live together; otherwise, mistakes and lies couldn't be avoided and  
would lead to self-destruction. Now if an ethical principle purports to restrict the range of possibility by will, then 
God can be entitled to think beyond non-contradictory things because He needn't be restricted in his perfect will.
